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REVIEWS
ESTATE PLANNING CASES, STATUTES, TEXT AND OTHER MATERIALS. By A.
James Casner. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1953. Pp. xxxv, 540,
Supplement 126. $10.00.
THE only thing that keeps the publication of this book from being big news
is the book itself. It is the product of at least six years of experimentation by
one of the country's most distinguished property professors; it is the first
coursebook out in the much publicized field of estate planning; it has a poten-
tial market limited only to the nation's population of law schools; it has power-
ful backing from those professional groups who usually confine their contacts
with legal education to criticism-all the ingredients of scholarship, originality
and public acceptance which should mark it as a rare and influential contribu-
tion to the teaching literature of the law.
It is not. In fairness to Professor Casner nowhere in the book does he
indicate that he intended it to be. He starts out by denying the newness of
the subject matter, thereby giving the back of his hand to those who would
have the world believe that estate planning is the new religion and they the
only prophets. "Estate planning has been a function of lawyers for centu-
ries.... The nature and scope of these advantages have changed from time
to time through the years, but it can surely be said that proper estate plan-
ning has always made a contribution to the financial welfare of a person's
family and to the preservation of the family wealth."1 He appears only inci-
dentally interested in capturing a national market. In compressing a huge,
sprawling subject into 497 pages (excluding the appendices and pocket sup-
plement) he has had to make countless adjustments, playing up certain fea-
tures of the material, playing down others, and omitting still others. Of neces-
sity his selection has had to be based on his own teaching needs rather than
on an attempt to satisfy the requirements of any and all who may some day
use his book. His treatment, perhaps because the subject will permit no other,
is more in the nature of a brief general survey than a traditional casebook. It
is, in short, a book of modest dimensions designed for part time use in an
advanced property course.
At one time Professor Casner apparently had in mind doing considerably
more.2 What made him change his plans? And what are the chances of future
1. P.v.
2. Professor Casner had this to say on the subject: "It is my belief that the proper
arrangement and selection of material in connection with each phase of the course as
outlined here will not only give the student an adequate knowledge of wills, future in-
terests, trusts, and related matters, but will do so in the framework in which he will have
to employ such knowledge in the future." Note, "An Estate Planning Course as a Sub-
stitute for Wills, Trusts, and Future Interests," appended to Leach, Property Latu Taught
in Two Packages, 1 J. LEGAL ED. 28, 62-3 (1948).
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authors effecting a more comprehensive coverage? In providing tentative
answers to these questions the book reveals much about the movement of
which it is the first representative. Estate planning for the curriculum is a
development of recent origin, dating from the period of revitalization in legal
education which followed the war. Up to now it has been more talk than
solid achievement. But the talk has been so unreservedly enthusiastic that the
least which has come to be expected of it is a minor revolution in important
areas of the curriculum. Its most optimistic advocates see in it a cure for all
the ills which beset the traditional estate courses-a formula for replacing
existing dryrot with a streamlined program wherein property and tax law
are put into context and the problems and atmosphere of the law office are
recreated in the classroom. Such has been the appeal of this campaign that
a simple description of an estate planning course, appearing a few years back
in the magazine Trusts and Estates, could evoke a flood of letters from pre-
sumably busy lawyers, trust officers, and insurance men of a volume and tone
sufficient to make the editors of Life magazine proud.3
Nobody could reasonably be expected to deliver on the promises made in
this buildup. Estate planning is not a subject which can be easily reduced to
precise definition and thereby given the substance and purpose required of
teaching materials. The problem is not unlike organizing a coursebook on
litigation. Where is the beginning? Where the end? And, for that matter,
what is to go in between? Even in practice, where the term "estate planning"
originated and currently enjoys such popularity, its meaning is obscured by
the indiscriminate use made of it. Anybody who has ever drafted a simple
will or sold a policy of life insurance is, by his own claim, a member of the
fraternity. Professor Casner sets his planners apart from the crowd by assum-
ing estates substantial enough to have tax problems. Estate planning refers
to the lawyer's activity in obtaining for his client and his client's family the
maximum financial enjoyment and security at the minimum (primarily tax)
cost. A breakdown into the details with which such a book must deal includes
planning information, techniques, and point of view. Each of these poses a
difficult problem for those who would bring the subject into the curriculum.
The planning specialist must be familiar with the intricacies of tax, prop-
erty, insurance, conflicts, business, and domestic relations law. This puts the
author to an election. Either his course is to be a substitute for half the basic
courses in the curriculum or only a supplement to them. Is it to be feast or
famine? The first alternative, aside from its obvious effect of disrupting vested
interests within the faculty, would make a course of wholly unmanageable size.
The second comes dangerously close to leaving little or nothing out of which
to make any course at all.
Professor Casner attempts a middle course. Basic property, income tax,
and trust law are left to other courses. In this regard he makes no exception
for wills and future interests, the subjects traditionally taken up in the third-
3. Harsch, Law Schwol Course in Practical Estate Planning, 90 TRusTs , ESTATr.S
292 (1951). The letters appear id. at 43642, 5034, 567-8, 635-6.
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year property course. By relying on outside materials for detailed instruction
in each, he is able to maintain his planning pattern in balance. While much
of the substance is seemingly gone, he is not prepared to concede it all: "this
work is designed to be self-sufficient for the development of estate planning
though the student has had no previous training in insurance, conflict of laws,
or estate and gift taxation."14 The book is not heavily burdened by the assump-
tion of the first two subjects. A certain number of conflicts questions are tn-
avoidable, but they are now settled in a fairly predictable way by ancillary ad-
ministration, reciprocal state exemption statutes (which protect intangibles in
some measure from multiple taxation), and the like. The "big" conflicts prob-
lems, unlike the "big" tax and property problems, are, for most estates, for-
tunately rare. Every estate, particularly where tied to a partnership or closely
held corporation, requires insurance. But the lawyer need not rely exclusively
on his own judgment; competent insurance people stand eager to assist him.
Within these limits the three chapters on conflicts, one on choice of law prob-
lems and the other two on the states' jurisdiction to levy death and income
taxes, and the chapter on insurance settlements are sufficient to acquaint the
student with the problems involved.
It is the treatment of estate and gift taxation which puts to challenge the
justification for a book of this kind. Estate planners tend to be on the defen-
sive when asked about their attitude toward taxes. Their disclaimers would
be more convincing if their writings were not so heavily tax-oriented. For
instance here, were the tax materials, particularly those pertaining to the
estate tax, removed, the substantial body of the book would be gone. An im-
pressive table of contents bearing for the most part property labels suggests
otherwise. But upon examination, much of what seems to have been promised
melts away. The chapters on intestate succession, wills, future interests, ad-
ministrative provisions, and selection of the fiduciary are extremely spare,
dealing in the broadest generalities with a few of the more important problems
for which the planner must be on his guard. The bulk of the book takes up
the major dispositive devices, including revocable, non-revocable, and amend-
able trusts, gifts, life insurance, employee benefits, concurrent estates, powers
of appointment, gifts to spouses (the marital deduction), charitable gifts, and
transfers of business interests. Four of these chapters are almost exclusively
tax. As for the rest, the tax materials provide the real meat; property con-
siderations, existing primarily as the wrapping, intrude now and again by way
of text, statute, insurance form or, infrequently, a case.5
Where is such a book to fit into the curriculum? Inasmuch as the tax
materials have undergone no apparent transformation in their new setting, the
student with previous tax background must find much of this a rehash of old
stuff. The author, perhaps in recognition of this fact, has used cases sparing-
4. P. vi.
5. The author reverses this emphasis in the chapter on Powers of Appointment. He
is probably saved, thereby, from having to resort to outside -materials for the examination
of this subject.
[Vol. 631200
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ly.6 While this may be a boon to the student, it puts a heavy burden on the
instructor who must do something with his teaching time. To fill the gap,
Professor Casner poses at regular intervals problems designed to test the
application of the points covered and to require analysis of the hypothetical
estate plans set out in the supplement. These are good problems: short, use-
able, and instructive. They are not, however, a substitute for the challenge of
new materials.
There is an alternative. Professor Casner suggests that the book might be
used without and presumably in lieu of a course in estate and gift taxation.
He himself apparently does not use it in this way and for good reason.7 The
book covers too much ground in too short a space (less than 500 pages) to
permit any one area of law being set out with the completeness of detail re-
quired for its separate study. The chapter on the marital deduction is as good
an exposition of that subject as can be found anywhere. But difficult problems
involving the application of Internal Revenue Code Sections 811 (c), (f) and
(g) are tossed off by means of textual notes, a few regulations, and problems.
The gift tax as a backdrop to the estate and income taxes is never really
developed except in the area of revocable or amendable transfers. A more
serious deficiency is in the book's own orientation. Taxes are posited exclu-
sively against a property background. There is neither room nor logical place
for considerations of tax policy or judicial-legislative history. Yet today, it
is generally conceded that any practitioner who would manipulate these taxes
with success must understand them in just such a context.8
A book for all its repetitiousness can be justified for the new insights which
it imparts. This might have been the case here, planning being as much a
matter of technique as it is of knowledge. The planner must, as a minimum,
understand and evaluate the human factors in the equation; he must be able
to elicit discreetly, but firmly, information which is sometimes so sacred that
a man will not confide it to his wife; he must lead, without coercing, the client
into making only the reasonable dispositions of which his estate is capable;
and above all he must have the technical competence to draft the instruments
necessary to give effect to the plan. Training in techniques of this kind has
a way of being largely futile, depending as it does on artificially simulated
conditions and on generalized approaches which may or may not conform to
6. I count thirty-four, nine of which appear in the chapters on conflict of laws.
Assuming that he is not going to rely heavily on cases, some of his selections seem curi-
ously out of balance. 'Why, for instance, include two cases on gift tax exclusions and twu
on whether a charitable remainder is deductible when subject to an outstanding life estate
plus a power under specified circumstances to invade the corpus? Both of these points
could easily be reduced to text leaving more room for fuller explanations of less obvivus
subjects.
7. His students have presumably had a thorough grounding in the subject by way of
VARRN AND SurREY, FEaDEPAL EsTxras AND Ginv TAxArioN- (1952).
S. Paul, Book Review, 60 YALE L.J. 573, 575 (1951). The two outstanding case
books in the field put great emphasis on this aspect of the subject. BirrKna, Esm A,:.
G=FT TA.-0ATN (1951); NV.uzmx AND Sur Y, FEaanu. EST.=T AND Gwr TAx,,bo:
(1952).
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the style of the law office in which the student ultimately practices. Professor
Casner tacitly concedes as much. Except in the supplement, he makes no effort
to humanize the materials by orienting them to the problems of hypothetical
property owners.9 His organization proceeds along more traditional lines
based on the technical forms of transfer. There are no exercises in drafting.
It is his hope that the student will acquire a measure of drafting facility by
detecting planted mistakes in the instruments which appear in the supple-
ment. His faith is not strong, or, as he comments, "In the final analysis, one
becomes a good draftsman only by doing a great deal of drafting." 10 The
same might be said with equal force of all planning techniques.
In writing this book Professor Casner has performed two services. He has
made available a good sourcebook for the third-year student who wants to pull
together his tax and property law in preparation for practice."' He has in
addition demonstrated that estate planning is not a subject readily adaptable
to the curriculum. His experience should give pause to future authors who
would duplicate his program. If this be a loss, the curriculum may well be
the better for it.
The objective here is to bridge the gap between office and classroom-a
frank admission that the significance of this area of the law is vocational and
should be treated that way. It is small wonder that the practicing bar, so often
critical of the law schools for their alleged failure to teach the practical skills,
should be delighted. Essentially, estate planning is an attempt to make peace
with these critics on their own terms. This is not to cite Professor Casner's
book, intentionally limited as it is, as being subversive of the best interests of
legal education. Nevertheless it does represent one distinguished scholar's
stamp of approval on a movement which, if it assumes more comprehensive
forms, potentially is subversive of those interests.
Much has been written of the modern law school's obligation to train more
than technical craftsmen. Dispute arises as to what that product is to be. He
may be styled a "national leader at all levels of authority' 1 2 or a "policy-maker
for the ever more complete achievement of the democratic values"' or just a
plain lawyer. The point is that these goals are not antithetical, nor do they
require different systems of training. The student, whatever his future may
hold, should spend his years in law school thinking and asking as many ques-
tions about the law-what it is and what it might be-as his own and his
instructors' capabilities will allow. It is to the credit of the law schools that
9. Originally he had in mind juxtaposing the estates of a stupid lout by the name of
W. Barton Intestate and a crafty fellow known as A. James Testator. This battle of
giants never materializes. See Casner's note to Leach, Property Law Taught it Two
Packages, 1 J. LEGAL ED. 28, 63 (1948).
10. P. 6.
11. It would be interesting in this connection to know just how much time Professor
Casner gives to this book in class as against time devoted to outside materials on future
interests.
12. Leach, Property Law Taught in Two Packages, 1 J. LEGAL ED. 28, 29 (1948).
13. Lasswell and McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Train-
ing in the Public Interest, 52 Y.ALE L.J. 203, 206 (1.943).
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in offering this opportunity they have seen their strength and played to it. The
gap between school and office must inevitably exist. Is it not also a vital
factor which has permitted the law schools to develop a distinctive type of
educational experience?
Vocational courses would sacrifice the objective approach to train for a
specific job from a specific point of view. The result must of necessity be a
narrowing of the student's perspectives at the very time that they should be
expanding. What, for instance, of the estate planner's attitude toward taxes?
He has been described as a "mental prisoner of the views and interests of
clients."1 4 Should a law school course assume, directly or indirectly, to ac-
celerate the occupational attitudes which this description implies? The student,
even if he may someday in fact become a planner, deserves a better fate. His
basic understanding will be more complete if for once in his career he has
viewed tax and property law from the point of view of an objective observer
who has at his disposal a wide range of perspectives including planning.
An estate planning approach is likely to win most of its adherents from
among those who are dissatisfied with the existing estate courses. Critics of
the present system make three poihts: (1) the basic estate courses (wills,
trusts, and gifts) are allocated too much time out of a jam-packed curriculum;
(2) existing arrangements, based on the forms of transfer, perpetuate rigid
and unrealistic divisions in the subject matter; (3) the courses tend toward
excessive preoccupation with details quite out of line with their intellectual
content. It does not follow from these criticisms that the only justification
for continuing these subjects in the curriculum is their vocational importance.
One possible solution here would be to combine the most important features
of the various subjects into a single course, cut to size by reducing much of
the detail to text. Such a course, designed for use in the first year, would
have as its objective the study of attitudes, judicial, legislative, and general,
toward the gift-making process. Specifically it would first introduce and locate
in the proper policy context the substantive limitations which are now imposed
upon the process (taxes, rule against perpetuities, statutes designed to protect
the family, and restraints on antisocial gifts) and, second, examine the privi-
lege of alienation as it actually operates with the will, gift, trust, insurance,
or right of survivorship. At an early stage in his law school career the student
would acquire a preliminary understanding of the total impact of the subject.
He would have as well a framework within which the later, specialized estate
courses (including perhaps some form of planning) would assume unity and
meaning.
In short, Professor Casner's book is designed to be both the practitioner's
friend and a contribution to the teaching materials of the law. Actually it
falls between the two objectives. It has limitations as a lawyer's desk book,
and, by trying to solace the profession, it fails to satisfy the scholarly demands
of the law school. ELaAS CLARK-
14. Paul, The Responsibilties of the Tax Adviser, 63 Hnv. L. REv. 377, 387 (1950).
-Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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